Isard Labs
Algorithmic trading research · Investor briefing
Sure-footed where others slip.
Search like a lab.·Reject like a fund.
18+ yrs on the desk·5 yrs of focused research·our own capital deployed
Confidential — prepared for prospective investors · Not an offer to sell securities
The hard problem
An edge that works gets crowded and arbitraged away. Yesterday’s signal becomes today’s noise — what worked stops working.
A winning streak can be pure chance. Over any short run, a real edge and a lucky one look identical.
Almost all price movement is random. Real, durable edge is rare and faint — easy to imagine, hard to find.
A great backtest or past run is usually survivorship and hindsight — it says what happened, not what will.
Gut feel or a model, the core problem is the same: telling a real, durable edge from luck. Intuition can’t — and a single backtest won’t.
The problem
The field publishes by the thousands and validates almost nothing — results overfit to history, leaking future data, or ignoring real costs. A fund’s hard problem isn’t a good-looking backtest — it’s proving the edge is real, durable, and not luck. That proof is what we manufacture.
1 — Olorunnimbe & Viktor, Deep learning in the stock market: a systematic survey (Artificial Intelligence Review, 2023): of 10,000+ publications identified, only 35 met the backtesting due-diligence criterion; of those, 4 were reproducible. Broader academic-replication evidence (the factor-zoo / anomaly replication crisis) in the appendix.What a real edge must clear
Distinguishable from luck — survives multiple-testing correction, not one lucky draw.
Still profitable after real slippage, fees and market impact — not just on paper.
Works on data it never saw in training. The backtest is evidence, not proof.
Holds across market eras — bull, crash, chop — not one lucky window.
Not overfit, not cherry-picked — the same rules, re-derived, still hold.
Almost nothing clears all five. That’s the whole problem — and why a raw backtest lies.
Why this needs a lab
No human can hand-test that space against five hard tests. Clearing the bar at scale takes a lab: an apparatus that generates candidates, tests each one, and rejects almost everything — so only what survives reaches capital.
Search like a lab.·Reject like a fund.
The product
Search like a lab.·Reject like a fund.
A Quant-as-a-Service research lab: we turn compute into validated, tradable edge — licensed to funds, not traded against them. Not demos, not black boxes.
What survives
The space of possible strategies runs to the trillions. Five disciplines kill all but a few. What survives has earned the right to manage money.
The defensible advantage
Anyone can generate strategies. Our moat is the validation gate that kills the ones that were only luck — built on 18+ years of method that is hard to copy and documented as IP.
The team
Who built this
Traction & validation
The journey so far
What exists today
This isn’t a pitch for something to be built. The engine runs at one-machine scale today — the raise turns it into a fleet.
Research-volume figures are repository counts (excl. dependencies) — development effort, not performance.Why it scales
Growth scales with hardware, not headcount — this raise turns one machine into a fleet.
The market
The customer
New and existing funds that want a validated edge they can’t build in-house — building that capability internally takes years and a team few can assemble.
The revenue model
Quant-as-a-Service: we license the edge and share in the result — we never manage the money or take market risk ourselves.
The margin
No market risk. Fees on capital and IP, not bets. Costs are largely fixed, so each new client multiplies revenue on research we’ve already built.
The competition
| What they sell | Representative players |
|---|---|
| Predictive signals | SparkTrade · Sanostro · I Know First |
| Execution algorithms | Pragma · Quantitative Brokers · Quod |
| Rules-based indices | Research Affiliates · Scientific Beta · TOBAM |
| Tools & infrastructure | CloudQuant · Premialab · StrategyQuant |
Isard ships the validated whole — a strategy that survived all five disciplines (data → alpha → adversarial backtest → execution → risk), not a single signal, algo, or tool.
The Quant-as-a-Service / Strategy-as-a-Service landscape; representative players. Full map & proof points in the appendix.The raise
The investor return
A high-margin IP company whose value compounds as the research, the recurring revenue, and the client capital all grow — priced like a research lab, not a 2-and-20 manager.
The risks
Edges decay → continuous search refills the pipeline. Luck masquerades as skill → the validation gate exists to catch exactly that. Key-person risk → the method is documented IP, not tribal knowledge.
Regulation → treated as a design input from day one — qualified-client gating, pre-trade risk controls and a compliance budget in the raise — with the specifics finalized by specialist counsel per jurisdiction.
The exit
Elite AI-researcher talent commands ~US$1–2M+/yr, and AI-team acqui-hires run into the hundreds of millions; a cash-generative lab can also distribute or support a later round.1
1 — Reported AI acqui-hire / researcher-comp benchmarks (2024–25). Illustrative; no exit is guaranteed. Pending legal review.The close
We’re raising US$50M to turn an award-winning, academically validated architecture into an institutional-scale Alpha Factory. If that’s a thesis you invest behind — let’s talk.
Sure-footed where others slip.
Luiz de Jesus · luiz.dejesus@isardlabs.com · linkedin.com/company/isard-labs
Appendix
Everything behind the one-line answers — the full thesis and science, the validation gate, the trajectory and economics, the founder’s record, the market and the category, compliance, and the story behind the name. Happy to go as deep as you want on any of it.
The thesis
The same compute-scaled, empirical method that lets AI labs predict the next token — pointed at the next price move. Hypotheses in, evidence out, at scale.
The heritage that made systematic funds compound: reject almost everything. Only signal that is provably non-random earns capital.
The two meet at one gate. Most firms stop at quant — math on price; we go a step further — the scientific method, applied to markets. We package the result as Quant-as-a-Service — validated strategies, licensed to institutions.
Why this is hard
① The people — retail, discretionary day traders, trading on feel
② The method — even a flawless backtest can be a lie
The strategy memorised the past. It cannot predict the future.
Tomorrow’s information leaked into yesterday’s decision. Invisible. Fatal.
Test a hundred, report the best. That’s not an edge — it’s a lottery winner.
Test enough combinations and you are guaranteed to find a winner in pure noise.3 The only defence: search millions — then try to kill each one.
1 — Chague, De-Losso & Giovannetti, Day Trading for a Living? (2020). 2 — ESMA review of retail CFD accounts (2018). 3 — Bailey, Borwein, López de Prado & Zhu, The Probability of Backtest Overfitting (Journal of Computational Finance, 2017).Why this is hard · the literature
65% of 452 documented anomalies fail to replicate (82% under a proper multiple-testing hurdle); ~half of published factors are likely false; predictor returns fall 58% after publication.1
Try enough configurations and a high Sharpe is almost guaranteed from pure noise. “A large proportion of backtests published in academic journals may be misleading.”2
Of 10,000+ ML stock-market papers, only 35 properly backtest — and just 4 reproduce. Data leakage spans 17 fields & 294 papers. Toy datasets, look-ahead, no real transaction costs.3
This is precisely what our validation gate is built to catch. We don’t trust the literature — we re-derive every claim and try to kill it before capital ever sees it.
1 — Hou, Xue & Zhang, Replicating Anomalies (RFS, 2020); Harvey, Liu & Zhu (RFS, 2016) — ~53% of 296 published factors are likely false discoveries, t>3 needed; McLean & Pontiff (J. Finance, 2016) — 58% post-publication decay. 2 — Bailey, Borwein, López de Prado & Zhu, Pseudo-Mathematics and Financial Charlatanism (Notices of the AMS, 2014). 3 — Olorunnimbe & Viktor (Artificial Intelligence Review, 2023); Kapoor & Narayanan, Leakage and the Reproducibility Crisis in ML-based Science (Patterns, 2023); López de Prado, Advances in Financial ML (2018) — k-fold CV leaks on financial series.The wedge
The market ships autonomous “AI agents” trading capital nobody should have trusted them with. Isard is the deliberate opposite.
The gate
We test the idea hard, across many different market conditions — not just the ones that flatter it.
A separate team tries to tear it apart. If there’s a flaw, their job is to find it first.
Every step is documented and locked. Nothing depends on one person remembering how it worked.
Even a good idea has to meet the market at the right time, not just any time.
Once it’s live, we compare every real trade to what we expected. Surprises get caught fast.
The exact methods stay ours. The discipline of running all five is the product.
The method · state of the art
It never sees tomorrow’s prices — only clean data and the true cost of every trade.
Judged only on data it never trained on — across many markets, not one lucky stretch.
The more ideas we try, the higher the bar the winner must clear.
Reverse it, scramble it, stress it through thousands of crashes. Only survivors get capital.
If there’s a way a strategy could be fooling us, we have a test that catches it — the discipline most never reach.
The search space
Every template has dials: which signals to combine, what parameters, which instruments, which timeframes, which regimes and exit rules. Multiply the choices and one idea explodes into an astronomically large space:
No human could ever hand-test this. Brute-force search at scale is the only way to comb it — and then the gate decides the few that survive.
The moat — our origin
Academia and the trading floor, in parallel since 2007 — meeting at the award-winning Liverpool AI master’s that became Isard Labs. Hard to hire. Harder to replicate.
Where we are → where we’re going
18+ years of expertise distilled into 5 years of focused research · real capital already deployed · the top-20 crypto assets · the methodology is ours.
More compute to research and search for strategies at scale — then expand into futures & ETFs and stand up the first client funds.
Many validated strategies, many funds — the edge manufactured and licensed across asset classes, at institutional scale.
Search like a lab.·Reject like a fund.·Now, at scale.
The opportunity
Against this, a US$1B fund is a fraction of a fraction. The ceiling on this business isn’t market capacity — it’s how much validated edge we can manufacture. Compute lifts that ceiling.
1 — SIFMA 2025 Capital Markets Fact Book, global equity market cap US$126.7T (year-end 2024). 2 — SIFMA 2025 Capital Markets Fact Book, global bond markets US$145.1T (year-end 2024). 3 — BIS Triennial Survey, daily FX turnover US$9.6T (April 2025). 4 — HFR, global hedge-fund industry AUM US$5.2T (1Q 2026).The field
| Fund (flagship) | AUM ≈ | Net return |
|---|---|---|
| AQR · Apex | ~US$140B | +19.6% |
| D.E. Shaw · Composite | ~US$85B | +18.5% |
| Point72 | ~US$41B | +17.5% |
| Two Sigma · Spectrum | ~US$70B | +10.9%* |
| Millennium | ~US$80B | +10.5% |
| Citadel · Wellington | ~US$67B | +10.2% |
| Man Group · AHL | ~US$228B | +5% |
| Renaissance · Medallion | n/d | ~39%** |
Tens to hundreds of billions each, on their latest reported full-year net returns — mostly double-digit (≈ +10–20%); trend-following (Man AHL) was softer at ~+5%, and Medallion is the ~39% long-run outlier. A US$1B client fund is a rounding error — and our conservative 10% base sits below the field.
Latest reported full-year net returns: AQR Apex +19.6%, D.E. Shaw Composite ~+18.5%, Point72 +17.5% (FY2025; Bloomberg / Bloomberg Law); Millennium +10.5%, Citadel Wellington +10.2% (FY2025; Hedgeweek, CNBC); Man AHL ~+5% (FY2025; Man Group). *Two Sigma Spectrum +10.9% is FY2024 (FY2025 not disclosed). **Renaissance Medallion ≈39% net annualised 1988–2018, employee-only fund (no current public AUM). AUM figures are firm-wide, approximate, latest 2025–26 disclosures; several funds blend quant with discretionary.The category
The quant stack is unbundling — cheap compute, commoditised data, margin compression — and a B2B market has formed around licensing research, signals and execution to institutions.
Goldman Sachs runs a Systematic Trading Strategies desk doing exactly this. The model isn’t novel — shipping the validated whole strategy is.
1 — Premialab (company-stated; premialab.com). 2 — SGX / Scientific Beta press release (Jan 2020): €186M for a 93% stake. 3 — CloudQuant (Business Wire, 2018): US$15M first allocation, US$92M cumulative, ~10% of monthly net profit to creators; figures ~2018-vintage. Goldman Sachs Marquee (Systematic Trading Strategies). Company-stated; pending independent verification.The business model
We charge on results we can both see and that keep us on the client’s side. Where we can’t see the result, we charge for access and effort — never more than the relationship is worth.
Customers are funds — new or existing — that want a validated edge. Margins are high: we license IP and share in the result — we never manage the money or take market risk, costs are largely fixed, and each new client multiplies revenue on the same IP.
How it ships (Quant-as-a-Service): an API signal feed or a packaged container that plugs into the client’s execution stack — the model Goldman Sachs runs through its Systematic Trading Strategies desk. Comparable economics are market-standard: CloudQuant allocates US$15–92M tranches to external strategies and pays ~10% of net profit.
You run it on your own systems and carry the operating cost. We charge a modest access fee on the capital it runs, plus a share of the profit — we only win when you win. Recurring, and it scales as you do.
One buyer, one strategy — exclusive. Priced between what we’d earn licensing it and what it’s worth to you, with part paid only if it keeps performing.
The ask
US$25M/yr × 2 years. The bottleneck between a validated 10% strategy and a 20–30% one is search at scale — this raise turns one machine into a fleet.
1,2 — Public cloud rates (2025): a 192-vCPU node (AWS m7i.metal-48xl) ≈ US$9.68/hr ⇒ ~US$0.05/core-hour ⇒ a ~10-min backtest <1¢; H100 GPUs ≈ US$2–4/GPU-hr; ~US$20M/yr ≈ US$1.7M/mo funds a large generation + validation fleet. 3 — Operations ~US$5M/yr: lean senior quant team ~US$3M (quant comp US$0.3–1M+ each), market data & infrastructure ~US$1M, compliance / legal / audit ~US$1M.Valuation framing
Replacement cost. Elite AI researchers command ~US$1–2M+/yr and AI-team acqui-hires reach the hundreds of millions; senior quants run US$1M+/yr. Five years of a fused academic + trading-floor team ⇒ ~US$20–40M and years to rebuild.1
Recurring licensing fees — the client runs the strategy — plus one-time blueprint sales, all on the client’s capital, with no market risk to us. A handful of client licences covers the lab; everything beyond is upside.
Priced pre-revenue, on team + thesis: Anthropic raised US$124M (Series A, 2021); OpenAI took US$1B from Microsoft (2019).2
Indicative structure: US$50M for 10–15% of the technology company → US$350–500M post-money.
1 — Elite AI-researcher comp ~US$1–2M+/yr and AI-team acqui-hires into the hundreds of millions (press reports, 2024–25); senior quant-researcher comp US$0.3–1M+ (industry compensation data, 2025). 2 — Anthropic, “Anthropic raises $124 million” (May 2021); OpenAI / TechCrunch, “Microsoft invests $1 billion in OpenAI” (July 2019). · Illustrative & non-binding, pending verification & legal review. Not an offer or solicitation.Return & exit
You own equity in a high-margin IP company priced like an applied-AI research lab, not a fund. Value compounds two ways: the IP and recurring revenue grow, and the lab is cash-generative — it can fund itself and distribute.
Quant funds, banks or AI labs buy the IP and team — in a market where elite researchers command ~US$1–2M+/yr and AI-team acqui-hires reach the hundreds of millions.
The licensing revenue is recurring and high-margin — once it covers the lab, the surplus can be paid out to holders.
As client AUM and the IP scale, later-stage or secondary capital provides liquidity at a stepped-up valuation.
Risks & mitigations
| Risk | How we mitigate it |
|---|---|
| An edge decays | Continuous search refills the pipeline; every live strategy is reconciled bar-by-bar, so a fading one is retired fast. |
| A “winner” was really luck | The entire validation gate exists to catch this — nothing reaches capital without surviving it. |
| Key-person dependence | The methodology is documented, version-controlled IP — not in one person’s head. |
| Regulation | Qualified-client gating, a compliance budget in the raise, and a license model that carries the lightest burden. |
| Crypto-only · compute cost | The raise funds compute; expansion into regulated futures & ETFs diversifies. No HFT or leverage arms race. |
Compliance by design
Algorithmic-trading work can require registration and credentials in regulated venues — we plan for it, and confirm what applies per jurisdiction with counsel.
Pre-trade risk checks, hard exposure limits and an automated kill-switch are built into every shipped strategy by design.
Our risk architecture already enforces volatility-scaled sizing, hard drawdown limits and an automated kill-switch — so a client deploying our work starts from sound, auditable controls. The exact regulatory mapping is finalized with specialist counsel per jurisdiction and client type.
General regulatory context, not legal advice. Specific obligations vary by jurisdiction and client type and are confirmed with specialist counsel; nothing here asserts current compliance with any particular rule.Why systematic
Discretionary trading runs on hardwired human biases — and can never answer the only question that matters: was it skill, or was it luck?
Systematic is the only path that can be measured, repeated, and disproved. You can’t trade on intuition forever.
Why now
The Isard — the Pyrenean chamois — is sure-footed where others slip. As capital floods toward unauditable “AI agents,” the durable edge belongs to whoever can search at scale and refuse to fool themselves about what they find.
Search like a lab.·Reject like a fund.·The moment compute makes that decisive is now.
Depth of research
Most of it was rejected — and that is the point. The archive of what didn’t work is the map of where the edge isn’t.
The name
Rupicapra pyrenaica — a high-altitude specialist (to ~3,000 m) that holds its footing on steep, icy ledges where predators can’t follow.
Execution slippage that erodes alpha — and a strategy slipping in a regime shift. We are built against both.
Walter Isard — father of Regional Science and an early developer of the gravity model of trade. Peter Isard — IMF economist on exchange rates & financial crises.
The universe
Today we cover the top-20 crypto assets by market cap. The raise widens the same disciplined search into the world’s most liquid futures and ETFs:
BTC, ETH, SOL, XRP, and the rest of the large-cap set — where the research began.
ES (S&P 500), NQ (Nasdaq-100), RTY (Russell 2000) — the deepest, most-traded equity markets.
CL (crude oil), GC (gold) — classic trend and macro markets.
ZN (10-yr Treasury note), ZB (30-yr Treasury bond) — the core of the interest-rate complex.
6E (euro / USD), 6J (Japanese yen / USD) — the most liquid currency futures.
SPY (S&P 500), QQQ (Nasdaq-100), IWM (Russell 2000), TLT (long Treasuries), GLD (gold), USO (oil) + sector ETFs.
1 · You run it — economics
Take a strategy that can run US$500M at about 15% a year. You host and operate it; we license it for a modest access fee on the capital it runs, plus a profit share — so we only win when you win.
≈ US$10M/yr at the US$500M · 15% case — US$2.5M access + US$7.5M profit share, plus set-up. Recurring, and it compounds as the client scales the capital and adds strategies.
Illustrative; access fee scales with deployed size (fixed annual minimum); profit share on contractually-reported P&L, where the law allows. Fee terms indicative, pending contracts & legal review.2 · We sell it — economics
The same US$500M · 15% strategy, sold exclusively to one buyer for roughly its 3-year edge-life. We price it transparently — never below what we’d earn licensing it ourselves, never above what it’s worth to the buyer.
The x-ray
Fund size (AUM) — by number of funds · log scale
Annual net return — across funds · bell with fat tails
By size, ~533 funds over US$1B hold ~85% of all assets — a US$1B client already sits in the top ~5%. By return, the industry clusters near +10%, exactly our conservative base. The edge is moving right.
Universe ~10,000+ funds, ~US$4T (Statista; With Intelligence). >US$1B “Billion-Dollar Club” ≈533 firms ≈82–86% of assets (With Intelligence, 2024). Returns: HFRI Fund-Weighted +10.0% in 2024, bell-shaped with fat tails, top/bottom-decile dispersion ~55pp (HFR; Aurum, 2024). Distribution shapes illustrative, anchored to these reported statistics.Important notice
This document is confidential and provided for discussion purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument, nor a prospectus or offering document. All figures — including strategy returns, AUM, breakeven, valuation, and projections — are illustrative, unaudited, and subject to verification, change, and legal review. Research-volume metrics describe development effort, not investment performance. Systematic and quantitative strategies carry risk, including loss of capital; past or simulated performance is not indicative of future results. Any offering of securities would be made only to qualified/eligible investors via definitive documentation and in compliance with applicable law. [ COMPLIANCE: final wording pending securities/legal review — do not distribute until approved. ]